Recently, a non-programmer friend pointed out that there is no simple explanation of capabilities available on the web. Less than a week later, another friend -- this one a senior operating system developer for a major UNIX software company -- said to me that he really didn't understand what I was working on (capabilities). If neither the lay reader nor the experts understand what these things are, an introductory description is definitely needed, so I set out to write one. I quickly discovered that doing so isn't easy. Capabilities themselves are very simple, but they turn everything people ``know'' about security upside down. A lot of people look at them and say ``this is too simple to possibly work.''
This essay is a basic introduction to capabilities and capability-based systems. Rather than try to give an exhaustive discussion, I have taken some editorial liberties in the interest of clarity:
This essay will tell you what the term access control covers, what a capability is, and provide some examples of how capabilities can be used to provide flexible access to objects without giving up security. I'll describe some problems that currently popular access control mechanisms cannot handle. I'll talk about the problem of revoking access, and how this is solved. Finally, I'll give my own opinion on how capabilities came to be rejected by mainstream computing people.
While this essay uses UNIX as its example system, the problems identified with UNIX exist in VMS, Windows/NT and Windows95 as well.
If you find this note helpful, or you have suggestions for improvement, please drop me some mail at firstname.lastname@example.org.
The basic problem of computer security is to control which objects a given program can access, and in what ways. Objects are things like files, sound cards, other programs, the network, your modem, and so forth. Access means what kind of operations can be done on these objects. Examples include reading a file, writing to a file, creating or deleting objects, communicating with another program, etc.
When we talk about ``controlling access,'' we are really talking about four kinds of things:
Preventing access: You want to make sure that one person cannot damage another, or peek at another person's private information. I should not be able to read your medical records, for example. You should not be able to delete my work. This is the what most people mean when they talk about computer security.
Limiting access. You want to ensure that a program or a user doesn't do more than you mean them to. For example, you might want to run a program off of the Web but prevent the program from reading or writing any files so that it cannot plant a computer virus or give away your private phone book. This issue has been getting more attention lately with all of the hype around Java.
Granting access. You may want to allow two people to work together on a document or to grant access to a particular file to someone else so that you can delegate a job to them. Note however, that you probably want to do this selectively. Just because we are working on a business plan together doesn't mean that I should get to read your medical records. From a practical perspective, this is just as important as the first two, but security people don't tend to think about it very much.
Revoking access. Having allowed access to an object, you may later need to take that access back when the person is no longer authorized to look at a particular document.
Access control is about determining what a program can access, not about what a person can access. In computers, people do not access objects; programs do. This distinction has practical importance for several reasons:
Having set the stage, we can now turn to what capabilities are, and how access control is accomplished using them.
The term capability was introduced by Dennis and Van Horn in 1966 in a paper entitled Programming Semantics for Multiprogrammed Computations. The basic idea is this: suppose we design a computer system so that in order to access an object, a program must have a special token. This token designates an object and gives the program the authority to perform a specific set of actions (such as reading or writing) on that object. Such a token is known as a capability.
A capability is a lot like the keys on your key ring. As an example, consider your car key. It works on a specific car (it designates a particular object), and anyone holding the key can perform certain actions (locking or unlocking the car, starting the car, opening the glove compartment). You can hand your car key to me, after which I can open, lock, or start the car, but only on your car. Holding your car key won't let me test drive my neighbor's Lamborghini (which is just as well -- I would undoubtedly wrap it around a tree somewhere). Note that the car key doesn't know that it's me starting the car; it's sufficient that I possess the key. In the same way, capabilities do not care who uses them.
Car keys sometimes come in several variations. Two common ones are the valet key (starts, locks, and unlocks the car, but not the glove compartment) or the door key (locks/unlocks the car, but won't start it). In exactly this way, two capabilities can designate the same object (such as the car) but authorize different sets of actions. One program might hold a read-only capability to a file while another holds a read-write capability to the same file.
As with keys, you can give me a capability to a box full of other capabilities.
Capabilities can be delegated. If you give your car key to me, you are trusting me not to hand it to somebody else. If you don't want trust me, you shouldn't hand me the key.
Capabilities can be copied. If you give me your car key, there is nothing to stop me from going down to my local car dealer and having a duplicate key made. In practice, this isn't much of a problem, because you wouldn't have handed me the key if you didn't trust me. If it comes down to desperate measures, you can change the locks on the car, making all of the keys useless. This can be done with capabilities too; it is known as severing an object, which has the effect of rescinding all capabilities. A rescinded capability conveys no authority to do anything at all.
In fact, there are only a few ways that capabilities and ordinary keys are different. The important differences are:
Key Points: Capabilities are simple and familiar. You use them every day, and they don't surprise you very often. If you think about ordinary keys and the sorts of access controls they provide you will not go far wrong.
In order to be useful, capabilities must be unforgeable. If you could just conjure up a key to any car you wanted, they wouldn't provide much protection. Protecting capabilities from forgery can be handled in either hardware or in system software. The software approach is more convenient because it can run on an ordinary PC. EROS, which is currently the fastest capability system in existence, does this in system software, and the data suggests that there wouldn't be any real benefit to doing it in hardware.
In a capability-based computer system, all access to objects is done through capabilities, and capabilities provide the only means of accessing objects. In such a system, every program holds a set of capabilities. If program A holds a capability to talk to program B, then the two programs can grant capabilities to each other. In most capability systems, a program can hold an infinite number of capabilities. Such systems have tended to be slow. A better design allows each program to hold a fixed (and small -- like 16 or 32) number of capabilities, and provides a means for storing additional capabilities if they are needed. The only way to obtain capabilities is to have them granted to you as a result of some communication.
Holding a large number of capabilities is usually foolish. The goal is to make the set of capabilities held by each program as specific and as small as possible, because a program cannot abuse authority it does not have. This is known as the principle of least privilege.
In this kind of system, a program that wants to perform an
operation on an object must hold a capability to that
object. To perform the action, it invokes the
capability and names the action that is to be
performed. In the UNIX® operating system, for
example, the system call
The main problem with capabilities is finding a way to save them to disk so that you can get them back. This is one of the main reasons that few capability systems have been built, and the main reason why most current capability systems break down at the file system boundary.
Assume for a minute that your program had a capability that let it create a file and write things down in it. Suppose it does so, and all of the information you need has now been written down. My helpful dog, Sheena, now comes along and kicks your computer's plug out of the wall. We start the system up and we now have to answer a chicken and egg problem:
These problems basically stumped capability system designers until the early 1970's.
The usual solution has been to have some kind of file
system, grant every program the right to use the
file system, and use some sort of user-identity based
system to decide which programs can open which files. If a
program is running on behalf of Natasha (my other dog), it
can open any of the files that Natasha created. Such a
system is called an access control list (ACL)
system. Every object has attached to it a list of users
and the actions that each user is authorized to
perform. If the user is on the access control list, then
programs operating on behalf of that user can obtain a
capability for that object. Once they have the capability,
they can manipulate the object itself. This is the purpose
of the UNIX
Take a minute to go back and look at the four things an access control mechanism was supposed to accomplish. ACL systems can prevent and revoke access, but they can neither limit access nor grant access. All programs running on behalf of Natasha -- even that raging inferno program written by a stranger in Norway -- can get access to any of Natasha's objects. In current ACL systems, there is no means to subset these rights. Also, there is no way for Natasha to delegate some of her authority (say, access to a single file she does not own) to me unless Natasha owns the object(s) in question. Unless she owns the object, she cannot modify the access control list.
A better solution is not to have a common file system, and not to give any program access to the file system by default. File systems are very useful, but most programs and subsystems do not need access to them. A spell checker that runs as part of a word processor, for example, needs access to the particular files it works on, but has no need to open any other files (and therefore no need of access to a file system).
If things aren't remembered by writing them in a file, some other means must be found to remember them. The solution is to simply remember everything. Every five minutes, write down all of the things the computer is working on. If Sheena pulls the plug, the system simply comes back to the last saved copy. Since the saved copy includes all of the running programs, there is no need to figure out who is entitled to what when the system restarts.
You might think this is an inefficient approach. In practice it's actually faster than file systems and requires less code.
Of course, the user may have walked away from the machine, so a means is needed to get back to their work. The solution is to give every user a program that runs on their behalf (the window system, if you like) at all times. The job of the login agent is to reconnect you to your window system, where all of your programs are still running.
Traditional access control systems run into trouble with a variety of important problems. Here are some examples of these problems in today's computer systems, and an explanation of why the problems do not exist in capability systems.
Consider the program that changes your password. It needs
the authority to read and write the password file, but
must not give that authority to you. In an ACL system the
only way to do this is to have access to the password file
restricted to a special user (
Both of these mechanisms are insecure. Giving the password program all of root's authority is simply too much. In the VMS mechanism, the program file itself can be attacked, leaving a hard to find security hole. The next time the program is run it will obey the new program, which can do absolutely anything.
Maybe more important, such programs tend to get into trouble over time. As maintainers alter these programs without fully understanding their constraints, they become sources of new security flaws.
The right solution is to explicitly give the program access to the password file, and not leave the password program lying around in a file system where it can be overwritten. In a capability system, you simply give the program a capability to the password database and let it run forever. You then give out a capability that lets people run the password program but does not let them read or modify that program.
Suppose you have a program that manages your financial data. You don't really want it sending that information to the IRS without your permission, but your computer is attached to the network. In an ACL system, since you have access to the network, so does the program. In a capability system you simply leave the capabilities for the network out when you install the program, guaranteeing that it cannot send data to those helpful, friendly people at the IRS.
Java solves this problem by ad-hoc restrictions. You may have noticed that people keep finding new security problems with Java. This is because ad-hoc security mechanisms don't work. It is better to have done the job right in the first place. Capabilities have a formal, mathematically sound model that can be (and has been) used to prove their security.
The really hard part, however, is dealing with collaboration. Suppose I have a secret program that is very valuable. I'm afraid to give out the binary code, because somebody will decompile it and steal my program (yes, this really does happen). You have some very secret data concerning the results of a new drug trial. You need to run my program, but you're not willing to show me the data.
In a capability system, we can set things up so that you can run the program without being able to see the code, but you are able to control what authority my program is given. Since you control the authorities, you can ensure that my program will not tell me your secrets. Since you cannot gain access to the binary code, you cannot steal the program. Most computer security experts believe that this is impossible. In ACL systems, it really is impossible.
One problem with capabilities is that there is no way to say "Remove all of Fred's access to this object." If Sheena (my dog) decides to leave me for another owner, how do I take away her capability for the dog food can? More realistically, if your employee leaves how do you make sure that their access to the file cabinet is cut. More importantly, suppose the user isn't fired, but is just moved to another department, and should no longer have access to sensitive documents in their old department?
On the face of it, there seem to be three different cases here:
Actually, the last two cases are the same.
In both capability and ACL systems, the first problem is solved by deleting the user's login.
In both capability and ACL systems, the second problem can be solved by creating a new login for the same user and selectively copying into the new account those personal documents that the user should retain access to. In many cases this is the best solution. In capability systems, another solution is possible: build a software-enforced special compartment that prevents the documents from being copied out of the compartment, and only let the user access those documents inside the compartment. This is not the same as a user group. In the user group approach, the user may have made copies of the documents. Deleting them from the group will prevent future damage, but does nothing to control theft while the user has legitimate access.
Revoking access to a particular object is exactly like the special compartment problem. Either you build a special compartment in advance, or there really isn't any good way to prevent the user from absconding with the data.
So if capabilities are so much better than ACLs, why haven't they been used? How come so many companies are shipping insecure operating systems when we know how to solve these problems?
Part of the problem is historical. The early capability systems were built in hardware before we knew a lot about hardware architecture, and used capabilities for access to main memory. This made them terribly slow and terribly complex. Those systems are a good bit less complex than today's operating systems, but their reputation persists.
In the 1970s, an operating system called MULTICS came along, and most of the world went galloping down the UNIX trail. UNIX is an extraordinary system, designed in a day when most computers were not connected to the outside world. In a world where all of the other users are known to you, collaboration is more important than security. The UNIX security mechanisms are adequate for a collaborative environment. Until the advent of the Internet and commonplace connectivity, only a few machines running dedicated financial applications needed to worry seriously about security, and those machines needed to implement it in the application anyway.
In the 1980s a lot of truly mediocre work was done on microkernels (which are similar to modern capability systems), and some equally bad analysis concluded that the problem was with microkernels in general rather than with the flaws of particular implementations. We now have examples of microkernels that are significantly faster than conventional operating systems, and at least one example of a capability system that is so.
The bottom line is that over the past 25 years a huge investment has been put into insecure systems, and until there is a compelling reason to change these systems the people who support them won't bother. In fact, computer software vendors have taken steps to ensure that they are not held liable for the flaws in their software, even when they are real, demonstrable, and incontrovertable. Until this changes, there is no reason to do secure systems. One of the arguments that has been made against capability systems is that capabilities and access control lists can be made formally equivalent (if you make enough repairs to access control lists, that is). This is a deceptive argument, because people think that means they are the same. Two things can be theoretically the same without being practically the same. I can imagine ways to augment traditional access control lists to handle suspicious collaborators on paper, but the solutions are both unacceptably draconian and too slow to actually use.
Things are changing slowly. Java is a partial step in the right direction, and the PR around Java is starting to wake users up to how exposed they are. Over time you can expect to see some of the Java ideas embedded in mainstream systems.
Actually, compatibility environments for UNIX have been built that run securely on top of capability systems (it's worth noting that you can't build a capability system on top of an ACL system), so it may not be necessary to discard existing code.
Hopefully, you now know what a capability is, and can start to take part in discussions about them. At some point soon I'll add links here to other sources of information for people who want to read further.
Copyright 1999 by Jonathan Shapiro. All rights reserved. For terms of redistribution, see the GNU General Public License