[cap-talk] Montesquieu, the *-property and implicit grantability
Rob J Meijer
rmeijer at xs4all.nl
Sat Dec 3 02:32:40 EST 2005
Jed has been making the argument that non-grantable capabilities and
any other form of blocking capability transfer is bad.
I think I've got a chalanging scenario for Jed to proof that this
argument is valid and alternatives are available.
Montesquieu devides the political authority into the legislative,
executive and judicial powers. Lets say that these 3 are to be described
as seperate sets of capabilities, lets also say that all 3 are than
to create 3 seperate POLA based subsystems. Lets also say that all sub
authorities are held by a large amounth of low level officials.
Now lets say that a subset of the low-level officials are fooled by a
potential despote to give him their authority.
With or without non-grantable capabilities, but with available
side-chanels, could one prevent the the 3 seperate political powers to
such a potential despote?
I used to think that seperated 'do' and 'grant' model surficed, but
after Jeds argumentation I am no longer sure that modern civilications
that implement Montesquieus principles like that are not vulnerable
to such vulnerabilities as described by Jed. If it does not, and
seperation is futile, than what organisational measures would be needed
to circumvent this vulnerability. It apears to me that history seems to
show that political systems somehow have this problem tackled, but
if not by virtue of seperation of grant and do capabilities, it is
unclear to me what other saveguards are in place.
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