[cap-talk] Bit gold
Nick Szabo
szabo at szabo.best.vwh.net
Fri Feb 25 15:25:33 EST 2005
I would be quite remiss to fail to mention here RPOW, Hal Finney's actual
working version of bit gold (as compared to my mere sketch). RPOW uses
a different solution for the vulnerability-to-third-party (V23P)
(formerly known as "trusted third party") problem -- a single server
on a tamper-evident card running audited code, the state of which
can be remotely attested. Not only is RPOW a great idea,
but the idea of remotely attesting servers instead of clients is a
huge, huge idea applicable to a wide variety of V23P problems. Remote
attestation of servers is much more likely to be a success than remote
attestation of clients. See
http://rpow.net/
> On that very different topic of money:
> > Of course any such mechanism of value exchange must map
> > into other means of exchange - like dollars.
>
> Bit gold need not be "mapped" to any other kind of money, although
> I'm sure if it became widespread exchanges would pop up. The value
> of gold and other unforgeably costly things, unlike fiat or
> credit instruments (including all current and envisioned
> Internet payment systems besides bit gold), exists without the
> need for trust in (reliance upon upright behavior of) human
> institutions. Trust-free, unforgeably costly money has far
> more history behind it than, say, dollars -- see
> http://szabo.best.vwh.net/shell.html.
>
> Bit gold would come very close to this ideal (i.e., it would
> achieve trust-free money up to Byzantine agreement in the titles
> directory and timestamping service, and its reliance on certain
> cryptographic assumptions that may be shaky).
Alan's suggestion helps to clarify this sentence -- the goal here
is to achieve vulnerability-free money, not to achieve money
that can't be trusted!
Nick Szabo
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