[cap-talk] The Capability Framework Hypothesis (was: Safety ofPassword Capabilities)

Karp, Alan H alan.karp at hp.com
Fri Mar 11 12:53:21 EST 2005

MarkM wrote:
> I think Nick may think Alan is here referring to the CryptoBrandMaker 
> <http://www.eros-os.org/pipermail/e-lang/1999-November/003049.
> html>, which 
> uses public-key cryptography to eliminate the TTP host of the 
> sealer/unsealer 
> pair. OTOH I suspect that Alan may actually be referring to 
> the simple 
> pointer-based sealer/unsealer pairs, whose distributed use 
> employs no extra 
> crypto beyond whatever cryptographic caps-as-data protocol we 
> may be using, 
> but which relies on the host where the pair was created. 
> Alan, is that true, 
> can you clarify?
I'm referring to network capabilities, so that rules out pointer-based
sealer/unsealer pairs, doesn't it?
> If Alice passes all the caps she gives to Bob through a 
> membrane (MarcS' 
> simpleMembrane at 
> http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/membranesNotaries/simpleMembran
> e.e is adequate 
> for this example), then Alice has given Bob all the 
> use-rights of these caps, 
> but not access to their identities, and therefore stripped of their 
> amplifiability with EQ-based amplifying caps that Mallet may have.
This approach sounds like path-based capabilities.

Alan Karp
Principal Scientist
Virus Safe Computing Initiative
Hewlett-Packard Laboratories
1501 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, CA 94304
(650) 857-3967, fax (650) 857-7029
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