[cap-talk] The Capability Framework Hypothesis (was: Safety
Karp, Alan H
alan.karp at hp.com
Fri Mar 11 12:53:21 EST 2005
> I think Nick may think Alan is here referring to the CryptoBrandMaker
> html>, which
> uses public-key cryptography to eliminate the TTP host of the
> pair. OTOH I suspect that Alan may actually be referring to
> the simple
> pointer-based sealer/unsealer pairs, whose distributed use
> employs no extra
> crypto beyond whatever cryptographic caps-as-data protocol we
> may be using,
> but which relies on the host where the pair was created.
> Alan, is that true,
> can you clarify?
I'm referring to network capabilities, so that rules out pointer-based
sealer/unsealer pairs, doesn't it?
> If Alice passes all the caps she gives to Bob through a
> membrane (MarcS'
> simpleMembrane at
> e.e is adequate
> for this example), then Alice has given Bob all the
> use-rights of these caps,
> but not access to their identities, and therefore stripped of their
> amplifiability with EQ-based amplifying caps that Mallet may have.
This approach sounds like path-based capabilities.
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Palo Alto, CA 94304
(650) 857-3967, fax (650) 857-7029
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