[cap-talk] - Karp - Capabilities - tracking responsibility (Was: Bellizzomi - Users in object/capability systems (was: MLS gone bad, Lampson))
Ian G
iang at systemics.com
Fri Dec 1 06:37:22 CST 2006
Valerio Bellizzomi wrote:
> On 29/11/2006, at 16.07, Karp, Alan H wrote:
>
>> Valerio Bellizzomi wrote:
>>>> I am assuming that when Tyler uses the capability it is over a
>> channel
>>>> to Jed authenticated as Tyler. Bob uses the capability over a
>> channel
>>>> authenticated as Bob. Since Tyler can't set up a channel to Jed
>>>> pretending to be Bob, there is no way Tyler can blame Bob for Tyler's
>>>> actions.
>>> Are we talking about "non-repudiation" here ?
>>>
>> No, audit for assigning responsibility. Non-repudiation assures Jed
>> that Bob cannot deny having taken an action that he actually took.
>> Audit for assigning responsibility assures Tyler that Jed won't blame
>> Tyler for actions taken by Bob, even if Bob uses a capability that Tyler
>> gave him.
>
> I don't see where is the difference with non-repudiation, if Bob can't
> deny having taken an action that he actually took, how can Jed blame Tyler
> for an action taken by Bob?
Apologies in advance, just jumping in here to point out a
potential reliance on a false assumption.
There is a big problem with non-repudiation that leads one
into traps all too frequently. Basically, it doesn't exist,
it is a contradiction.
The issue is that there is a conflict in expectations
between the technical capabilities and the human
capabilities. The technical domain can create a trail of
records, perhaps better termed "evidence". Digital
signatures such as hashes or pk sigs are particularly
interesting forms of evidence because of their strong
properties, or more cynically, because of their exotic
mathematics.
OTOH, we have people. They do things differently, and they
are actual agents & principles, in legal/governance terms
**. They act, and they state. They deny and they claim.
In effect, a human can always repudiate, they can always say
they did not do something.
Non-repudiation does not exist as a property because it is
impossible to stop a person repudiating; such an action
being the action of a human agent, not of code & bits.
In reality what happens is the technology provides a trail
of evidence. Audits can follow the trail and suggest
hypotheses as to what happened. When it comes to blame /
responsibility, etc, that can only be decided by humans,
based on the sum of evidence as found and recorded by the
tech. All of these steps are subject to error, enough so
that blame is always a judgment, and never a certainty.
iang
PS: ** I use the term agent in the normal, non-security
sense of people who are in contractual relationships, which
is somewhat reversed from the particular security sense.
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