[cap-talk] - Karp - Capabilities - tracking responsibility (Was: Bellizzomi - Users in object/capability systems (was: MLS gone bad, Lampson))
Valerio Bellizzomi
devbox at selnet.org
Fri Dec 1 14:59:46 CST 2006
On 01/12/2006, at 13.37, Ian G wrote:
>Valerio Bellizzomi wrote:
>> On 29/11/2006, at 16.07, Karp, Alan H wrote:
>>
>>> Valerio Bellizzomi wrote:
>>>>> I am assuming that when Tyler uses the capability it is over a
>>> channel
>>>>> to Jed authenticated as Tyler. Bob uses the capability over a
>>> channel
>>>>> authenticated as Bob. Since Tyler can't set up a channel to Jed
>>>>> pretending to be Bob, there is no way Tyler can blame Bob for
Tyler's
>>>>> actions.
>>>> Are we talking about "non-repudiation" here ?
>>>>
>>> No, audit for assigning responsibility. Non-repudiation assures Jed
>>> that Bob cannot deny having taken an action that he actually took.
>>> Audit for assigning responsibility assures Tyler that Jed won't blame
>>> Tyler for actions taken by Bob, even if Bob uses a capability that
Tyler
>>> gave him.
>>
>> I don't see where is the difference with non-repudiation, if Bob can't
>> deny having taken an action that he actually took, how can Jed blame
>Tyler
>> for an action taken by Bob?
>
>Apologies in advance, just jumping in here to point out a
>potential reliance on a false assumption.
>
>There is a big problem with non-repudiation that leads one
>into traps all too frequently. Basically, it doesn't exist,
>it is a contradiction.
>
>The issue is that there is a conflict in expectations
>between the technical capabilities and the human
>capabilities. The technical domain can create a trail of
>records, perhaps better termed "evidence". Digital
>signatures such as hashes or pk sigs are particularly
>interesting forms of evidence because of their strong
>properties, or more cynically, because of their exotic
>mathematics.
>
>OTOH, we have people. They do things differently, and they
>are actual agents & principles, in legal/governance terms
>**. They act, and they state. They deny and they claim.
>In effect, a human can always repudiate, they can always say
>they did not do something.
>
>Non-repudiation does not exist as a property because it is
>impossible to stop a person repudiating; such an action
>being the action of a human agent, not of code & bits.
>
>In reality what happens is the technology provides a trail
>of evidence. Audits can follow the trail and suggest
>hypotheses as to what happened. When it comes to blame /
>responsibility, etc, that can only be decided by humans,
>based on the sum of evidence as found and recorded by the
>tech. All of these steps are subject to error, enough so
>that blame is always a judgment, and never a certainty.
This is true, but I think that we talk only about the technical issue of
evidence.
>
>
>iang
>
>
>PS: ** I use the term agent in the normal, non-security
>sense of people who are in contractual relationships, which
>is somewhat reversed from the particular security sense.
>
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