[cap-talk] Confinement Confusion
David Hopwood
david.nospam.hopwood at blueyonder.co.uk
Tue Jul 18 13:27:04 EDT 2006
Karp, Alan H wrote:
> David Hopwood wrote:
>
>>But I never really understood why the simple security property or the
>>*-property would be desirable anyway, given the restrictions they place
>>on frequently needed patterns of cooperation. It is very odd that
>>these properties have been considered important challenge problems for
>>access control systems, when they are almost irrelevant to real-world
>>security problems, and rigorous enforcement of them would often
>>*preclude* secure cooperation.
>
> The Bell-LaPadula model also includes a means for explicitly lowering
> the security level. Hence, a High object can create a High message
> "Tell me when you see an enemy soldier.", have it declassified and
> transmitted it to Low objects. Each Low object makes its reports as
> High. Hence, only Highs can aggregate the data, but Lows know what data
> to send.
>
> You can turn this example around. The Low writes to High a message
> "Where should I go?" High uses the aggregated information on enemy
> locations sent by the Lows, creates a response as High, has it
> declassified and sent to Low. Awkward but useful.
>
> I believe this approach is used in real life (death) situations that
> don't involve computers at all. Indeed, as has been noted on this list,
> the sense is "We trust the people; they've been cleared. It's the
> computers we're not sure of."
If that is how the simple security property and *-property are supposed
to be used, then most papers that discuss them have done a lousy job at
explaining it. A typical example:
"On the Inability of an Unmodified Capability Machine to Enforce the *-Property"
<http://www.erights.org/elib/capability/duals/boebert.html>
# The attribute associated with a subject is its "clearance," a value
# which expresses the trustworthiness of the user on whose behalf the
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
# program is executing.
--
David Hopwood <david.nospam.hopwood at blueyonder.co.uk>
More information about the cap-talk
mailing list