[cap-talk] The Limits of POLA's Utility - Social Engineering
Ian G
iang at systemics.com
Wed Jun 7 05:27:53 EDT 2006
Toby Murray wrote:
> It's not so much that Alice's files got accessed. It's just the bigger
> question of "Can POLA stop viruses?". One thing that has always been a
> big selling point with capabilities for me is POLA and that in the
> current environment, POLA might largely kill the effectiveness of the
> current breed of malware. I guess I'm just saying that if we can't also
> protect users from themselves, then POLA might not be enough.
>
> I take the implied point that Bob might not "deserve" helping in this
> instance.
A more acceptable interpretation might be that we
can't figure out economically how to help Bob. So
he has to suffer; we are not a public utility.
> That said, it's interesting to look at the historical
> precursors to POLA and where they were motivated from. I've read some of
> Nick Szabo's stuff that draws parallels between eg. the Separation of
> Powers and POLA. (I hope I'm not misrepresenting him here). There are
> quotes from the Federalist papers (if I remember correctly) that
> motivate the design of the governmental system with language like
> "ambition must be made to counteract ambition", "if all men were angles
> government wouldn't be necessary". Surely, these are arguments along the
> lines of "The system must protect users against their own [bad] nature,
> for the good of all".
Separation of powers is a concept well utilised
in governance, a.k.a. accounting. (I would imagine
the examples you quote draw from that science, which
has been practiced ever since the invention of the
agent, I suppose.)
In this case, the assumption is that the technical
system cannot protect, so we must augment it with
additional eyes. The 4 eyes principle is that there
are always two pairs of eyes on an activity that is
subject to perversion. The 6 eyes principle is that
one person instructs, another acts, and a third just
watches. Accountants could go on for ever on this...
This is something of somewhat current note - in the
phishing debacle, we have often expressed the claim
that a system of strong security must include the
user, and a system of security that does not include
the user is a weak one. It's not a comfortable claim
though.
(The military analogue is the minefield, which is
considered futile unless guarded with troops.)
> A system that prevented Bob from doing the illegal/immoral thing would
> make him and Alice more secure. My original point was that POLA might
> not be sufficient to do this sort of thing. But if not POLA, then what
> could help protect Bob from himself?
>
No system can do that. Bob is himself, the system
is just his agent.
iang
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