[cap-talk] network level designation and authorization
coderman at gmail.com
Wed Jun 7 23:04:42 EDT 2006
On 6/7/06, David Hopwood <david.nospam.hopwood at blueyonder.co.uk> wrote:
> Not to mention that systems which rely solely on "perimeter defence", i.e.
> protecting an inside from an outside, are extremely brittle. It often takes
> only one vulnerability to completely bypass a perimeter defence system.
i suppose this is the first item of business: trashing the concept of
VPN as perimeter defence.
are those unguessable YURL's so unguessable once broadcast over
wireless? leaked across a sniffed LAN? people mention SSL here, but i
would argue SSL (in its traditional form: verisign, thawte, etc) is
just as broken for this purpose as VPN's used for perimeter defense of
an unprotected interior.
i understand the aversion to VPNs in their traditional form, and the
historical reasons for this distance. but the concept of authenticated
and private communication between entities seems fundamental. when
moving POLA out of a single system (Polaris/etc) what do you suggest
for communication privacy? this is where i see VPN's playing a
helpful role (since they provide the authentication and privacy for
communication "underneath" applications and operating systems rather
than forcing them to kludge such crypto bits into every service and
host which expects privacy)
More information about the cap-talk