[cap-talk] Capability accounting
Nick Szabo
szabo at szabo.best.vwh.net
Sat Jun 24 14:34:46 EDT 2006
Ian Grigg:
> What it does run slap bang into is the decision
> threshold which Nick is talking about. If you
> ask the user "shall I pay for this Cap, it
> costs 0.001 cents" you just blew it, because
> you consumed 0.01 cents of the user's time.
If the user's opportunity cost is $60/hour
and you take 6 seconds of the user's time, that's a
mental transaction cost of 10 cents. And that doesn't
even count the cost of a distraction interrupting
the user's train of thought, which is often far higher
still.
Furthermore, if you _don't_ ask the user then
you probably lack the preference information on which
effective market pricing and many other resource
allocation and security schemes depend. And even
if you do ask the user, but the user just makes a
hasty random decision rather than contemplating
or thinking about it, then the resource allocation
or security scheme is still not getting very much
useful information.
If you ask the user to make petty decisions, the user will grow
disgusted at the distractions and go use some other system.
If you don't ask the user enough important questions, then you
probably lack the preference information on which good resource
allocation and security depend. That's the conundrum which creates
the mental accounting barrier to micropayments. Since the user to
avoid mental transaction costs prefers to specify his preferred price
in big and simple chunks, (doesn't want to be "nickled and dimed"),
there's not much point in a money system where payments can be
made in much smaller chunks, and this is why after tens of
millions of dollars of investment and more than a decade of
hoopla none of the dozens of micropayment schemes have succeeded.
For the same basic reasons, it's usually counterproductive to ask
the user to make small security decisions.
In some situations you may be able to infer preferences that
a reasonable or average user might have (and computer resource
allocation and security schemes, like the old Soviet Union's
central planners, do this all the time), but resource allocation
designs, including those that nominally look like markets but
still lack good preference input, would be far superior if they
made their preference assumptions explicit and recognized the
limitations of the approach.
Sometimes one can obtain preferences that users already input
into devices, as in the following example of the price-sensitive
thermostat being tried in California:
http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2006/04/smart-contracts-reduce-mental.html
I recall that some here have argued that a good cap system simply
looks at normal user input and infers security preferences
from it. I concur with that sentiment, because it economizes on
mental transaction costs. But would help for designers to make more
explicit the assumed relationship(s) between input and security
preference; such inferences may often be faulty.
Nick Szabo
http://szabo.best.vwh.net/
http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/
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