[cap-talk] "General Capability Model"

[Alan Grover]

Karp, Alan H wrote:
> Alan Grover wrote:
>> Richard Kulisz[2] (on c2.com wiki) seems to have a solution which he
>> calls "General Capability Model"
> 
> Aside from the name, I don't see what this scheme has to do with
> capabilities.  The fundamental aspect of a capability is that it
> combines designation with authorization.  Kulisz says, "So if you have a
> delete permission set then this means that you have permission to delete
> that capability (assuming you can get a message through to it)."  That
> doesn't sound like a capability to me.

I find his writing very difficult to follow. Though as far as I can, I
think his idea has the standard capability properties. As well, the
capability is an object, and thus subject to the rules (explaining the
quote above). My summary is, no doubt, wrong on many points.

Is it worth trying to read past his contempt and arrogance?

-- 
Alan Grover
awgrover at mail.msen.com
+1.734.476.0969

(The "email signature" and/or digital-signature
are only for informational and integrity purposes
and does not constitute a legal signature)

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 254 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
Url : http://www.eros-os.org/pipermail/cap-talk/attachments/20070818/615119f7/attachment.bin