[cap-talk] Is "Authority" Subjective?
Mark Miller
erights at gmail.com
Sun Jul 1 01:13:18 EDT 2007
How embarrassing. My initial numbering of the interpretations is
reversed from that used in the rest of my message. Please reply to
this one instead of the original. Sorry.
On 6/30/07, Mark Miller <erights at gmail.com> wrote:
> I am among those who don't know CSP. However, your explanation seems
> quite clear, thanks. But it does leave open a remaining crucial
> ambiguity: Does the expression "b -> ...", combined with your
> description "b is performed by another object Bob" mean x) "If the
> system is in a state where only b would be accepted and if Bob does
> attempt b, then b will happen and cause the described state
> transition." or y) "If the system is in a state where only b would be
> accepted, then Bob will perform b and cause the described state
> transition."?
>
> Interpretation #y is more consistent with my vague sense of what CSP
> is about. But this interpretation presumes to describe the actual
> behavior of all the players, rendering the players too deterministic
> to be considered players of a game, rendering any description of
> authority mostly meaningless. As David Wagner says later on, causality
> is about counterfactuals. A full characterization of everyone's
> behavior leaves open where to draw the counterfactuals.
>
> Interpretation #x in effect says only what the bounds are on what the
> players might do in a given state, without prescribing which of these,
> if any, they will do. This interpretation is more consistent with your
> arguments below, and with my sense of what authority analysis should
> be about. Given this interpretation, I think your argument #2 is more
> correct but misphrased. Alice can cause Bob not to be able to perform
> b, therefore Alice can cause Bob to be able to perform b. But only if
> we know that Bob will always attempt to perform b when it would be
> accepted (as in interpretation #y), can we say that Alice can cause
> Bob to perform b.
>
> It seems that your arguments as stated require interpretation #x
> regarding Alice's actions but interpretation #y regarding Bob's. This
> is consistent with the kind of authority analysis done by SCOLL, where
> Alice would be described as a non-relied-upon subject and Bob would be
> described as a relied upon subject.
>
>
> > I can't decide -- I keep dithering between the following two arguments.
> > I suspect that in different circumstances, both are valid. But I might
> > be wrong -- I'm hoping you can help me decide whether one of them is
> > definitely more valid than the other.
> >
> > Argument 1: Before Alice acts, Bob can perform b -- the system won't
> > refuse it.
>
> The above sentence suggests interpretation #x, where Bob might not
> perform b even when he could.
>
> > After Alice finishes acting, Bob can perform b -- the system
> > won't refuse it.
>
> But in you next argument, you imply that Alice might perform a1 and
> not perform a2, which means Alice might have the authority to prevent
> Bob from being able to perform b.
>
> > With and without Alice acting, Bob can still perform b.
>
> But if Bob might not actually perform b even when he could, then Alice
> can't cause him to perform b, and so Alice doesn't have authority to
> cause Bob to perform b.
>
> > Hence, Alice doesn't cause Bob to perform b and hence, has no authority
> > to do so.
> >
> > Argument 2: If Alice performs a1, she can cause Bob to perform b by
> > performing a2. In fact, if she refuses to perform a2, the system
> > deadlocks and Bob will never perform b.
>
> If Alice can so refuse in a system described by this CSP expression
> (as in interpretation #x), then Bob can likewise refuse to perform b.
>
> > Hence, by performing a2, Alice
> > causes Bob to perform b. Hence, Alice does have authority to cause Bob
> > to perform b.
--
Text by me above is hereby placed in the public domain
Cheers,
--MarkM
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