[cap-talk] Capabilities and Freedom vs. Safety

[Pierre THIERRY]

Scribit James A. Donald dies 22/07/2007 hora 10:31:
> > 2. The system-wide installation utility should be able to install
> > programs in such a way that (a) they are confined when run, but (b)
> > the user cannot inspect their code or data.
> This makes it likely that such programs will not necessarily be
> written to act in the best interests of the user - that they will, in
> some sense, be Trojans or malware.

Could you detail how a Trojan or malware could be designed as to
effective when run confined?

And why should an uninspectable code be more malicious than one
inspectable? Isn't it partly because code inspection isn't effective as
a practical security measure that we are designing capability systems?

Curiously,
Pierre
-- 
nowhere.man at levallois.eu.org
OpenPGP 0xD9D50D8A
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