[cap-talk] Persistence as a cap value

[Rob Meijer]

On Thu, March 13, 2008 01:30, James A. Donald wrote:
> Jed Donnelley wrote:
>  > I think for me the main issue is that of how access is
>  > delegated.  When I refer to access in the previous
>  > sentence I mean persistent access - that is, not a
>  > form of access that will be reset on a system reboot
>  > or any other sort of non explicit means.  A means of
>  > delegation that can be counted on as a "permanent"
>  > (only changed by intent) form of access control
>  > management.
>
> Persistent capabilities are bad.  They are too valuable,
> therefore need too much protection, too much management,
> and your mother is not going to provide the necessary
> management any more than she does for ACLs. We should
> therefore always seeks ways of doing things that do not
> require persistent capabilities.

I believe this is true only in the absence of (pseudo) persistent
process mechanisms. A persistency mechanism could provide all
the protection you need IMO.

Rob