[cap-talk] Webkeys vs. the web

[Karp, Alan H]

David-Sarah Hopwood wrote:
> 
> I disagree, because sharing webkeys is an intended feature. As others have
> pointed out, the scenario above does not describe a valid attack -- the news
> item page will not have a direct webkey link to your account page (it might
> have a link that requires reauthentication, but that is not a problem).

I agree that the ability to share webkeys is a useful feature, but I contend that it's too dangerous because of the way people share URLs.  I agree that requiring authentication addresses the problem, but one of the goals of webkeys is avoid authentication.  Besides, if my intention is to share some authority with you, do I need to tell you my password?
> 
> Do you have any other proposed attacks that would motivate treating webkeys
> differently from (other) URLs?
>
I don't consider these examples to be attacks.  They are user errors that arise from the inability to distinguish authority bearing webkeys from non-authority bearing URLs.  I contend that we need to design our user interface so that users are less likely to make this kind of mistake. 

________________________
Alan Karp
Principal Scientist
Virus Safe Computing Initiative
Hewlett-Packard Laboratories
1501 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, CA 94304
(650) 857-3967, fax (650) 857-7029
http://www.hpl.hp.com/personal/Alan_Karp