[cap-talk] Reducing Ambient user authority in a Type Safe /Memory Safe OS.

Marcus Brinkmann marcus.brinkmann at ruhr-uni-bochum.de
Fri Dec 18 04:58:41 PST 2009


Rob Meijer wrote:
> The process of creating an anonymous file to my knowledge still uses
> linking into a namespace that is vulnerable to race condition attacks.

It's only vulnerable if used incorrectly ever since O_EXCL was added, see
mkstemp(3).

> That is in the anonymous file creation I've seen, you do an open/create
> call followed by an unlink. Is there a way to create an anonymous file
> without using a temporary namespace to link it into?

The GNU/Hurd implemented an extension to the POSIX API that allowed creation
of anonymous, unnamed files (the files were never linked into the filesystem).
 The GNU/Hurd is a capability system, but the same functionality could be
implemented in a normal Unix-like system as well.  However, the usual reasons
prevent this from happening (it would be redundant, and applications/libraries
couldn't rely on the new interfaces being available anyway, so nobody would
use it as there is no significant benefit over the existing method).

Thanks,
Marcus



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