[cap-talk] Confused Deputies in Capability Systems
Karp, Alan H
alan.karp at hp.com
Fri Feb 6 16:38:58 EST 2009
Toby Murray wrote:
> Consider the final example from
> http://www.comlab.ox.ac.uk/people/toby.murray/papers/NDA.pdf in which
> users use non-delegatable authority provided by a "credential"
> capability to access classified networks via routers who are supposed
> check the authenticity of such credentials before relying on them.
> Suppose a router fails to authenticate a credential. Then in a very
> strict sense, it could be considered a confused deputy.
Allowing access with a potentially forged credential is a bug, not a confused deputy.
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