[cap-talk] Security by safe language processing

[Ben Kloosterman]

You can also add no TLB flushes (or even lookups in a non VM system)  ,
better cache coherency and a simple Memory Manager.

It's worth noting  these benefits are especially suited for smaller devices
where performance is a big problem.

And we need to remember there are many Language based systems  ( most of
these OS are in their infancy and just running). 

Virtual Memory Single ( or few) Address Space    -Singularity
Single Address Space no Virtual Memory no paging  ( Installer Compile)  -
Cosmos-B 
Single Address  Space Virtual Memory with Paging (JIT)  - Mosa , Ensemble 
Single Address  Space Virtual Memory with Paging (Installer Compiler)  -
SharpOS 
Hardware protection  with strongly typed language - ? (Im sure some exist) 


Regards, 

Ben 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: cap-talk-bounces at mail.eros-os.org [mailto:cap-talk-
>bounces at mail.eros-os.org] On Behalf Of Sandro Magi
>Sent: Saturday, September 05, 2009 10:22 PM
>To: General discussions concerning capability systems.
>Subject: Re: [cap-talk] Security by safe language processing
>
>Jed Donnelley wrote:
>> Higher performance in that it can avoid hardware context switches that
>> are typically rather expensive?
>
>Eliminate context switches, eliminate MMU runtime overhead (which is
>quite high), reduce the need for kernel data structures (like address
>space mappings and process descriptors), provide safety guarantees
>within programs (not just isolation between programs), more granular
>system extensions, no user-supervisor transition costs, and more.
>
>The disadvantages are equally numerous of course, primarily being you
>are stuck with the limitations of your runtime VM, whatever they may be.
>
>Sandro
>
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