[cap-talk] Security by safe language processing

[Jed Donnelley]

David-Sarah Hopwood 
<mailto:cap-talk%40mail.eros-os.org?Subject=Re:%20%5Bcap-talk%5D%20Security%20by%20safe%20language%20processing&In-Reply-To=%3C4AA3231C.3000806%40jacaranda.org%3E>david-sarah 
at jacaranda.org
Sat Sep 5 22:49:00 EDT 2009


> > Not only that, but the LBS system compilers and/or byte code verifiers
> > must be valid against all possible inputs over a long range of time -
> > perhaps all time.
>
>That is not necessarily the case. A system could be designed so that the
>input to any code generation step is always kept, and the output is only
>treated as a cache. Then, whenever the code generator is upgraded, the
>cached output is invalidated and will be automatically regenerated as
>needed. There have been language-based systems (for example Self) that
>were able to do dependency checking and automatic recompilation at least
>as complicated as this, although with different motivations.

Sorry I didn't see the above before firing off my last message.

I think I understand the above approach.  Do you agree that such an
approach is very different from current systems in that with it
one can't move binaries from system to system?

It seems to me that a cache invalidating event could have serious
consequences for system performance - at least for a time.

--Jed  http://www.webstart.com/jed-signature.html  
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