[cap-talk] Security considerations for cookies
toby.murray at comlab.ox.ac.uk
Fri Feb 12 02:01:15 PST 2010
Your section on ambient authority is an excellent summary, as no doubt
you intended it to be, of much of the philosophy shared by many on
this list. Thanks for taking the time to distil it out so clearly.
Others on this list with more web savvy can probably give more useful
feedback on specifics so I'll leave it to them.
On 11 February 2010 23:39, Adam Barth <cap-talk at adambarth.com> wrote:
> People of cap-talk,
> As some of you know, I'm working on a specification for how cookie
> work in practice. As part of writing the spec, I'd like to add a
> section on the security perils of using cookies. I was hoping that
> this group could give me some feedback on what I have so far.
> 7. Security Considerations
> 7.1. General Recommendations
> The cookie protocol is NOT RECOMMENDED for new applications.
> For applications that do use the cookie protocol, servers SHOULD NOT
> rely upon cookies for security.
> redundant form of authentication, such as HTTP authentication or TLS
> client certificates.
> 7.2. Ambient Authority
> security vulnerabilities because user agents occasionally issue HTTP
> requests on behalf of remote parties (e.g., because of HTTP redirects
> or HTML forms). When issuing those requests, user agent attaches
> cookies even if the entity does not know the contents of the cookies,
> possibly letting the remote entity exercise authority at an unwary
> server. User agents can mitigate this issue to some degree by
> providing APIs for suppressing the Cookie header on outgoing
> Although this security concern goes by a number of names (e.g.,
> cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery), the issue stems
> from cookies being a form of ambient authority. Cookies encourage
> server operators to separate designation (in the form of URLs) from
> authorization (in the form of cookies). Disentangling designation
> and authorization can cause the server and its clients to become
> confused deputies and undertake undesirable actions.
> Instead of using cookies for authorization, server operators might
> wish to consider entangling designation and authorization by treating
> URLs as object-capabilities. Instead of storing secrets in cookies,
> this approach stores secrets in URLs, requiring the remote entity to
> supply the secret itself. ALthough this approach is not a panacea,
> judicious use of these principles can lead to more robust security.
> 7.3. Clear Text
> The information in the Set-Cookie and Cookie headers is transmitted
> in the clear.
> 1. All sensitive information conveyed in these headers is exposed to
> an eavesdropper.
> 2. A malicious intermediary could alter the headers as they travel
> in either direction, with unpredictable results.
> 3. A malicious client could alter the Cookie header before
> transmission, with unpredictable results.
> Servers SHOULD encrypt and sign their cookies. However, encrypting
> and signing cookies does not prevent an attacker from transplanting a
> cookie from one user agent to another.
> In addition to encrypting and signing the contents of every cookie,
> servers that require a higher level of security SHOULD use the cookie
> protocol only over a secure channel.
> 7.4. Weak Confidentiality
> Cookies do not provide isolation by port. If a cookie is readable by
> a service running on one port, the cookie is also readable by a
> service running on another port of the same server. If a cookie is
> writable by a service on one port, the cookie is also writable by a
> service running on another port of the same server. For this reason,
> servers SHOULD NOT both run mutually distrusting services on
> security-sensitive information.
> Cookies do not provide isolation by scheme. Although most commonly
> used with the http and https schemes, the cookies for a given host
> are also available to other schemes, such as ftp and gopher. This
> lack of isolation is most easily seen when a user agent retrieves a
> URI with a gopher scheme via HTTP, but the lack of isolation by
> scheme is also apparent via non-HTTP APIs that permit access to
> cookies, such as HTML's document.cookie API.
> 7.5. Weak Integrity
> Cookies do not provide integrity guarantees for sibling domains (and
> their subdomains). For example, consider foo.example.com and
> bar.example.com. The foo.example.com server can set a cookie with a
> Domain attribute of ".example.com", and the user agent will include
> that cookie in HTTP requests to bar.example.com. In the worst case,
> bar.example.com will be unable to distinguish this cookie from a
> cookie it set itself. The foo.example.com server might be able to
> leverage this ability to mount an attack against bar.example.com.
> Similarly, an active network attacker can inject cookies into the
> Cookie header sent to https://example.com/ by impersonating a
> response from http://example.com/ and injecting a Set-Cookie header.
> The HTTPS server at example.com will be unable to distinguish these
> cookies from cookies that it set itself in an HTTPS response. An
> active network attacker might be able to leverage this ability to
> mount an attack against example.com even if example.com uses HTTPS
> Servers can partially mitigate these attacks by encrypting and
> signing their cookies. However, using cryptography does not mitigate
> the issue completely because an attacker can replay a cookie he or
> she received from the authentic example.com server in the user's
> session, with unpredictable results.
> 7.6. Reliance on DNS
> The cookie protocol relies upon the Domain Name System (DNS) for
> security. If the DNS is partially or fully compromised, the cookie
> protocol might fail to provide the security properties required by
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