[cap-talk] Security considerations for cookies

David Wagner daw at cs.berkeley.edu
Mon Feb 15 23:29:12 PST 2010


David Wagner  wrote:
>Mark Seaborn  wrote:
>>Can't these attacks be addressed by the usual means of including a suitably
>>unguessable secret in the URL or POST parameter (which can be checked
>>against the cookie if you want to protect against URL leaks)?
>
>No.  Parameters cannot prevent overwriting of cookies.
>Implication: Whatever protocol you layer on top of protocols had
>better be resilient to overwriting of cookies (or at least, to those
>kinds of overwriting that can occur, given your threat model).

I see that I can't write.  What I meant to say:

 Implication: Whatever protocol you layer on top of *cookies* had
 better be resilient to overwriting of cookies (or at least, to those
 kinds of overwriting that can occur, given your threat model).

Sorry.

P.S. I hope I'm interpreting what you mean by "these attacks" accurately:
I'm interpreting it to mean "attacks that overwrite cookies".


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