[cap-talk] Security considerations for cookies

[Ben Laurie]

On 15 February 2010 15:35, Adam Barth <w3c at adambarth.com> wrote:

> >> If the UA issues a single HTTP request, an active network attacker can
> >> spoof an HTTP redirect response and cause the UA to generate an HTTP
> >> request to the server.  Now, if the user agent is configured to use
> >> Strict-Transport-Security for that host, there is some hope.  :)
> >
> > Thanks for explaining.  Is there a name for this attack?  "Cookie
> > overwriting" sounds appropriate (and you use this term in your paper),
> but
> > Googling for this term doesn't produce many references.
>
> I don't know of a good name.  Informally, we've been referring to it
> as "cookie forcing."
>

This is a form of session fixation attack. Not sure if that helps much, but
at least it nails down what the threat is.
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