[e-cvs] cvs commit: e/doc/talks/pisa/paper index.html

[markm@eros.cs.jhu.edu]

markm       01/12/28 13:29:51

  Modified:    doc/talks/pisa/paper index.html
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Index: index.html
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RCS file: /cvs/e/doc/talks/pisa/paper/index.html,v
retrieving revision 1.19
retrieving revision 1.20
diff -u -r1.19 -r1.20
--- index.html	2001/12/28 18:14:31	1.19
+++ index.html	2001/12/28 18:29:51	1.20
@@ -438,11 +438,11 @@
         amount of money, by placing it on the left square of the board, taking 
         us to state D. At this point, either party may still decide they're unsatisfied, 
         withdraw their piece, and reenter the loop of bidirectional arrows (at 
-        B or C). Or, in the upper right board state, Bob may pick up the money 
-        offered by Alice. Bob has accepted Alice's offer. This is the irreversible 
-        commitment step shown by the bold unidirectional arrow, and takes us to 
-        state E. From here, the only possible move is for Alice to pick up Bob's 
-        knight, leaving the game in terminal state F.</font></p>
+        B or C). Or, while in board state D, Bob may pick up the money offered 
+        by Alice, accepting Alice's offer. This is the irreversible commitment 
+        step shown by the bold unidirectional arrow, and takes us to state E. 
+        From here, the only possible move is for Alice to pick up Bob's knight, 
+        leaving the game in terminal state F.</font></p>
       <p>How is this contract self enforcing? What prevents cheating? Who needs 
         to trust whom with what? To answer these questions, we must start by explaining 
         what is happening on whose computer. We assume that each player trusts 
@@ -491,21 +491,21 @@
         to speculate on the possible organization of the market for smart contract 
         creation.)</p>
       <p>The &quot;$-Issuer&quot; and the &quot;Stock-Issuer&quot; transforms 
-        the movement of the pieces into a transfer of <i>third-party assayable 
-        electronic rights</i>, or <i>erights</i>. A $-Issuer, or more conventionally 
-        a bank, is effectively a title company for money. For money on record 
-        at the bank, the rights to the money changes hands by the transfer of 
-        quantity between accounts -- shown above as <i>purses</i> within the issuers. 
-        When Alice places the gold bar on the board, her computer, the $-Issuer, 
-        and the contract host engage in a three-way cryptographic transaction 
-        that bring about the transfer of title, at the $-Issuer, of that much 
-        money from Alice to the contract host. An honest contract host would consider 
-        this money to be only a piece on the board, which can be picked up (transfered 
+        the movement of pieces into a transfer of <i>third-party-assayable electronic 
+        rights</i>, or <i>erights</i>. A $-Issuer, or more conventionally a bank, 
+        is effectively a title company for money. For money on record at the bank, 
+        the rights to the money changes hands by the transfer of quantity between 
+        accounts -- shown above as <i>purses</i> within the issuers. When Alice 
+        places the gold bar on the board, her computer, the $-Issuer, and the 
+        contract host engage in a three-way cryptographic transaction that bring 
+        about the transfer of title, at the $-Issuer, of that much money from 
+        Alice to the contract host. An honest contract host would consider this 
+        money to be only a piece on the board, which can be picked up (transfered 
         to the possession of a player) according to whatever may be the rules 
         of the game. We refer to this as <i>oblivious escrow</i> -- the contract 
-        host, merely by running the contract, esures that goods in escrow can 
-        only be release under the agreed conditions, without needing to understand 
-        what those conditions mean.</p>
+        host, merely by running the contract, ensures that rights in escrow can 
+        only be released under the agreed conditions, without needing to understand 
+        those conditions.</p>
       <p>A dishonest contract host could abscond with the money instead, which 
         is why contract hosts needs to be widely trusted. A widely trusted contract 
         host presumably has a valuable reputation at stake, and this risk helps