[e-cvs] cvs commit: e/doc/talks/pisa/paper index.html

[markm@eros.cs.jhu.edu]

markm       01/12/28 13:46:46

  Modified:    doc/talks/pisa/paper index.html
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Index: index.html
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RCS file: /cvs/e/doc/talks/pisa/paper/index.html,v
retrieving revision 1.20
retrieving revision 1.21
diff -u -r1.20 -r1.21
--- index.html	2001/12/28 18:29:51	1.20
+++ index.html	2001/12/28 18:46:46	1.21
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         contract host or issuer, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.) 
       </p>
       <p> The money is an eright in part because it is <i>third-party assayable. 
-        </i>Bob, through the contract host, can issuer backing this eright, and 
-        what the value of this eright is according to the issuer, even though 
-        Bob does not currently possess this eright, and the contract host does 
-        not understand this eright. With such assayability, the $-Issuer, the 
-        Stock-Issuer, and the contract host need not have any prior knowledge 
+        </i>Bob, through the contract host, can determine which issuer backing 
+        this eright, and what the value of this eright is according to the issuer, 
+        even though Bob does not currently possess this eright, and the contract 
+        host does not understand this eright. With such assayability, the $-Issuer, 
+        the Stock-Issuer, and the contract host need not have any prior knowledge 
         or trust of any of the other four players. For the game to be meaningful, 
         Alice and Bob must have prior knowledge and trust in both issuers and 
         the contract host, but not in each other. Even if Alice and Bob are both