[e-cvs] cvs commit: e/doc/talks/pisa/paper index.html

[markm@eros.cs.jhu.edu]

markm       01/12/28 13:49:59

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         contract host or issuer, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.) 
       </p>
       <p> The money is an eright in part because it is <i>third-party assayable. 
-        </i>Bob, through the contract host, can determine which issuer backing 
-        this eright, and what the value of this eright is according to the issuer, 
-        even though Bob does not currently possess this eright, and the contract 
-        host does not understand this eright. With such assayability, the $-Issuer, 
-        the Stock-Issuer, and the contract host need not have any prior knowledge 
-        or trust of any of the other four players. For the game to be meaningful, 
-        Alice and Bob must have prior knowledge and trust in both issuers and 
-        the contract host, but not in each other. Even if Alice and Bob are both 
-        use-once pseudonymous identities with no apparent physical location [<a href="#Vinge84">Vinge84</a>], 
-        under these conditions, they can transact with each other <i>as if</i> 
-        they fully trust each other.</p>
+        </i> Even though Bob does not currently possess this eright, Bob, through 
+        the contract host, can determine which issuer backs this eright, and what 
+        the value of this eright is according to this issuer, even though the 
+        contract host does not understand this eright. With such assayability, 
+        the $-Issuer, the Stock-Issuer, and the contract host need not have any 
+        prior knowledge or trust of any of the other four players. For the game 
+        to be meaningful, Alice and Bob must have prior knowledge and trust in 
+        both issuers and the contract host, but not in each other. Even if Alice 
+        and Bob are both use-once pseudonymous identities with no apparent physical 
+        location [<a href="#Vinge84">Vinge84</a>], under these conditions, they 
+        can transact with each other <i>as if</i> they fully trust each other.</p>
       <h3>Assets + Contracts x Time + ?? = Capital</h3>
       <p><font color="#000000"><img src="images/6-option.gif" width="379" height="235" align="right">The 
         Smart Contracts explained so far, the vending machine and the exchange