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markm@eros.cs.jhu.edu
markm@eros.cs.jhu.edu
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markm 02/01/03 16:51:43
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be surmounted? Country-by-country institutional reform is possible, but
inevitably slow. New options based on computer networks and trusted computational
agents may provide a shorter path. By leveraging trust in first-world
- institutions while enabling the evolution of contractual arrangments that
- fit local needs and traditions, this approach could bring advanced property
- systems to regions now paralyzed by their absence.</p>
+ institutions while enabling the evolution of contractual arrangements
+ that fit local needs and traditions, this approach could bring advanced
+ property systems to regions now paralyzed by their absence.</p>
<h1><a name="intro"></a>Introduction</h1>
<p>Hernando de Soto, in <i>The Mystery of Capital</i> [<a href="#deSoto00">deSoto00</a>],
shows that the poor of the world have, in his terminology, <i>assets</i>
@@ -217,7 +217,8 @@
architecture, as does the highway system. In all cases, a sparsely connected
actual network acts for most purposes like a densely connected network.
For example, from any airport you can fly to any other airport, almost
- as if there were flights between every pair of airports.</p>
+ as if there were flights between every pair of airports. For many purposes,
+ it acts like the network shown on the right.</p>
<p>Similarly, in the first world, two strangers can meet and conduct business
as if they had prior knowledge of and trust in each other, by virtue of
their reliance on a mutually recognizing backbone of widely trusted intermediary
@@ -242,7 +243,7 @@
we can analyze the Fukuyama low-trust world (in which the fanout from
each node is small) and the de Soto missing-hub world, and immediately
recognize which effect has the greater impact on a society's effectiveness:
- it is the absence of the hubs that ultimately prevent large scale complex
+ it is the absence of the hubs that ultimately prevents large scale complex
cooperative arrangements from forming. Even with high cultural proclivity
for individual-to-individual trust, in the absence of hubs, the resulting
virtual network would at best form small islands of densely connected
@@ -481,17 +482,16 @@
changes the board state, changing which moves are legal during the next
turn.</font></p>
<p><font color="#000000">For example, Figure 4 shows the six possible board
- states of a simple negotiation and exchange game, derived from Dean Tribble's
- and Randy Farmer's work for the American Information Exchange. Let's say
- Alice is playing the left side of the board and Bob the right. In the
- initial board state, A, neither of the pieces is on the board. The gold
- bar, representing money, is off the board on the left, which portrays
- its possession by Alice at this time. For concreteness, let's say the
- knight represents stock. Bob might offer a certain amount of stock to
- Alice by placing it on the right square of the board, taking us to board
- state B. Alice might not respond soon enough, in which case Bob may withdraw
- his offer by taking back the knight, bringing us back to state A. That's
- why the first transition arrow is shown as bi-directional.</font></p>
+ states of a simple negotiation and exchange game [<a href="#Amix91">Amix91</a>].
+ Let's say Alice is playing the left side of the board and Bob the right.
+ In the initial board state, A, neither of the pieces is on the board.
+ The gold bar, representing money, is off the board on the left, which
+ portrays its possession by Alice at this time. For concreteness, let's
+ say the knight represents stock. Bob might offer a certain amount of stock
+ to Alice by placing it on the right square of the board, taking us to
+ board state B. Alice might not respond soon enough, in which case Bob
+ may withdraw his offer by taking back the knight, bringing us back to
+ state A. That's why the first transition arrow is shown as bi-directional.</font></p>
<p><font color="#000000">Or Alice may respond to Bob's offer with a certain
amount of money, by placing it on the left square of the board, taking
us to state D. At this point, either party may still decide they're unsatisfied,
@@ -580,7 +580,9 @@
both issuers and the contract host, but not in each other. Even if Alice
and Bob are both use-once pseudonymous identities with no apparent physical
location [<a href="#Vinge84">Vinge84</a>], under these conditions, they
- can transact with each other <i>as if</i> they fully trust each other.</p>
+ can transact with each other <i>as if</i> they fully trust each other.
+ The hubs -- the issuers and the contract host -- thereby succeed at providing
+ virtual trust connectivity between their spokes -- Alice and Bob.</p>
<h3>Assets + Contracts x Time + ?? = Capital</h3>
<p><font color="#000000"><img src="images/6-option.gif" width="379" height="235" align="right">The
smart contracts explained so far, the vending machine and the exchange
@@ -635,43 +637,48 @@
-- the creation of yet more forms of capital.</p>
<h3><img src="images/7-layering.gif" width="308" height="304" align="right">Networks
of Games</h3>
- <p>What we need, quite simply, is to turn this new electronic right Alice
- holds -- the right to sit in the left chair, i.e., the right to play the
- left side of this ongoing game -- into an eright, a third-party-assayable
- transferable electronic right. To do so requires an issuer for this new
- right. Since the contract host is already managing access to this chair,
- we may as well have it double as the issuer for the eright to sit in this
- chair. Just as Alice could tell the $-Issuer to transfer some of her money
- from her purse to some else's, we can enable Alice to tell the contract
- host to transfer her eright to sit in this chair to someone else. The
- contract host would then revoke Alice's access to the chair, and issue
- fresh access to the new player, much as the $-Issuer would with Alice's
- money.</p>
+ <p>To make this new new right Alice holds widely tradable, we need to turn
+ this right -- the right to continue playing the left side of this ongoing
+ game -- into an eright, a third-party-assayable transferable electronic
+ right. To do so requires an issuer for this new right. Since the contract
+ host is already managing access to this chair, we may as well have it
+ double as the issuer for the eright to sit in this chair. Just as Alice
+ could tell the $-Issuer to transfer some of her money from her purse to
+ some else's, we can enable Alice to tell the contract host to transfer
+ her eright to sit in this chair to someone else. The contract host would
+ then revoke Alice's access to the chair, and issue fresh access to the
+ new player, much as the $-Issuer would with Alice's money.</p>
<p>With this ability to compose networks of games, it seems we have the
ability to express the full range of contract layering used in modern
finance. Not that modern finance is directly relevant to the needs of
the poor, but it is a good test of the generality of our framework.</p>
- <p>But wait. This structure decouples knowledge in a way quite different
- than anything in the financial world. We have the contract host issuing
- rights it does not understand, since these rights are produced by games
- it runs, but does not understand. The contract host is not in a position
- to vouch for any meaningful property of the rights it is issuing, so how
- can widespread trust in the contract host translate into credible global
- transferability of derived rights? How can this derived right be assayable
- if even its issuer doesn't understand it? Let's walk through the example
- depicted in Figure 7.</p>
+ <p>But wait. In order to resolve our conflict, this structure decouples
+ knowledge in a way quite different than anything in the financial world.
+ We have the contract host issuing rights it does not understand, since
+ these rights are produced by games it runs, but does not understand. The
+ contract host is not in a position to vouch for any meaningful property
+ of the rights it is issuing, so how can widespread trust in the contract
+ host translate into credible global transferability of derived rights?
+ How can this derived right be assayable if even its issuer doesn't understand
+ it? Let's walk through the example depicted in Figure 7.</p>
<p>Alice starts out simply as a player of the original options game, hosted
- by contract host #1. While Alice finds herself in the resulting valuable
- situation -- while the options game is in state A -- she encounters Fred,
- who would also find this situation valuable. Fred, were he convinced that
- Alice's chair sitting rights mean what Alice says they mean, would be
- willing to play a different game on contract host #2, perhaps our original
- negotiation game, in which this right, issued by contract host #1, would
- appear as a movable piece. Unfortunately, having just met, Fred and Alice
- don't trust each any more than Alice and Bob do. Fortunately, Fred does
- have prior knowledge and trust of contract host #1. Unfortunately, contract
- host #1 has no idea if the right to sit in this chair of this game means
- what Alice claims it means, or anything else. </p>
+ by contract host #1, whose five participants are enclosed in the horizontal
+ rectangle. While Alice finds herself in the resulting valuable situation
+ -- while the options game is in state A -- she encounters Fred, who would
+ also find this situation valuable. Fred, were he convinced that Alice's
+ chair sitting rights mean what Alice says they mean, would be willing
+ to play a different game on contract host #2, perhaps our original negotiation
+ game, in which this right, issued by contract host #1, would appear as
+ a movable piece. Alice appears in the same role in both these games --
+ as a player. Contract host #1 also appears in both these games -- it appears
+ as the contract host in game #1 (the horizontal rectangle), and it appears
+ as an issuer in, game #2, of the right to sit in the left chair of game
+ #1. Hence the tilted overlap of the rectangles.</p>
+ <p>Unfortunately, having just met, Fred and Alice don't trust each any more
+ than Alice and Bob do. Fortunately, Fred does have prior knowledge and
+ trust of contract host #1. Unfortunately, contract host #1 has no idea
+ if the right to sit in this chair of this game means what Alice claims
+ it means, or anything else. </p>
<p>Fortunately, with Alice's consent, Fred can ask contract host #1 for
the text of the contract (the source code of the program), the current
state of the board, and the assays of all the pieces presently on the
@@ -685,37 +692,52 @@
access, he may not find the derived rights comprehensible at reasonable
cost and move on. More commonly, if the contract is understandable to
some number of others, including some Fred trusts, Fred may turn to them
- for advice on the contract's meaning -- the computational analog of legal
- advice.</p>
+ for advice on the contract's meaning -- the analog of legal advice. With
+ this step, derived right become erights about which other contracts can
+ be written, deriving further erights.</p>
<h3><a name="resolution"></a>Resolving the Conflict</h3>
- <p>The above scenario, applied to informally owned assets, could resolve
- the conflict de Soto explains, but without resort to procrustean homogenization
- of legal systems. The informally owned assets are not the literal physical
- objects themselves, they are rights derived from these objects according
- to informal local laws and negotiated arrangements. To the extent the
- logic of these arrangements can be successfully expressed in the new language
- of smart contracts -- with more literal physical objects represented as
- underlying assets, <i>as if</i> these had once been separately owned --
- then the smart contract will have preserved this local knowledge in a
- form that can be uploaded to widely trusted contract hosts, transforming
- them into capital. The contract hosts would specialize in providing the
- trust connectivity needed for global transferability. Each smart contract
- would specialize in providing the local knowledge. Using our new technological
- enablers -- the ability to safely and faithfully run rights-handling programs
- one neither trusts nor understands -- these two specialties can be smoothly
- combined without homogenizing the knowledge or imposing an impossible
- learning burden on the contract host. </p>
- <p>There will remain pressures for homogenizing capital-creating-contracts
- -- normal market pressures. In the above scenario, Alice will no longer
- lose the sale to Fred through Fred's lack of trust in Alice. But she is
- still in danger of losing the sale through Fred's inability to understand
- the contract's meaning. Further, only standardized contracts can create
- fungible assets tradable on large exchanges. However, these pressures
- can gradually work themselves out over time, and in competition with the
- benefits provided by custom contracts, well after starting on the digital
- path. This is to be contrasted with the governmental path, in which pervasive
- rule homogenization is the necessary first step, and therefore also a
- major barrier to starting on the governmental path.</p>
+ <p>The above steps, applied to informally owned assets, could resolve the
+ conflict de Soto explains, providing global transferability without resort
+ to procrustean homogenization of legal systems. </p>
+ <p>The first step, the separation of the contract from the contract host,
+ allows the contract to specialize in capturing local knowledge, while
+ the contract host specializes in providing the trust connectivity needed
+ for global transferability. Our new technological enablers -- the ability
+ of the contract host to safely and faithfully run rights-handling code
+ it neither trusts nor understands -- allows these two specialties to be
+ combined without conflict. </p>
+ <p>Our second step is contracts that unfold over time, creating derived
+ rights. This step would be applied twice. First, to model the base rights
+ <i>as if</i> they were derived from prior simpler rights to more literal
+ physical objects. Informally owned assets are not literal physical objects
+ themselves, they are rights derived from these objects according to informal
+ local laws and negotiated arrangements. To the extent the logic of these
+ arrangements can be successfully expressed in the new language of smart
+ contracts -- with more literal physical objects represented as underlying
+ assets, <i>as if</i> these had once been separately owned -- then the
+ smart contract will have preserved this local knowledge in a form that
+ can be uploaded to widely trusted contract hosts. </p>
+ <p>The third step enables the local-knowledge embodying rights created in
+ the previous steps to be widely tradable erights. This step allows these
+ three steps to applied repeatedly, creating complex networks of contracts
+ that build on each other. This allows the second step to be applied yet
+ again to create yet more abstract erights, like mortgage, setting loose
+ the power of capital formation. The collateral would be, not the physical
+ property itself, but the rights to the property held by the original property
+ holder, according to customary law in that community, as recorded at the
+ time of titling.</p>
+ <p>Although the conflict is resolved in this scenario, there will remain
+ pressures for homogenizing capital-creating-contracts; but there are normal
+ market pressures. In the above scenario, Alice will no longer lose the
+ sale to Fred through Fred's lack of trust in Alice. But she is still in
+ danger of losing the sale through Fred's inability to understand the contract's
+ meaning. Further, only standardized contracts can create fungible assets
+ tradable on large exchanges. However, these pressures can gradually work
+ themselves out over time, and in competition with the benefits provided
+ by custom contracts, well after starting on the digital path. This is
+ to be contrasted with the governmental path, in which pervasive rule homogenization
+ is the necessary first step, and therefore also a major barrier to starting
+ on the governmental path.</p>
<h1><a name="legitimacy"></a>Backing and Legitimacy</h1>
<p>For purely electronic assets, like fiat money and stock, at this point
we have, perhaps, an adequate picture. The title listing for these assets
@@ -737,10 +759,10 @@
were not honored. Under these circumstances, even governments mostly understood
that coercive enforcement would have had too terrible a cost. De Soto
documents well the repeated victories of squatters over governmental law.</p>
- <p>The missing ingredient was the need to accomodate pre-existing local
+ <p>The missing ingredient was the need to accommodate preexisting local
arrangements. These are the source of the legitimacy governing current
control of the property, and any new system can only be seen as legitimate
- if it incorporates and build on the old. On this issue, the digital path
+ if it incorporates and builds on the old. On this issue, the digital path
has the huge advantage over the governmental one explained above. But
what of the disadvantage? The Net is a purely non-coercive medium, it
transmits only information -- effectively speech -- but cannot transmit
@@ -748,9 +770,9 @@
the world -- such as title -- but they cannot force the world to come
along. Unlike government-based title transfer, these changes of title
are not <i>backed</i> by a coercive enforcement apparatus. How may we
- compensate for this lack? For concretenness, in order to establish possibility,
+ compensate for this lack? For concreteness, in order to establish possibility,
we propose here two complementary techniques, but we do not presume to
- forsee what the actual outcome of the market discovery process will be.
+ foresee what the actual outcome of the market discovery process will be.
This should be an area ripe for entrepreneurial invention. </p>
<h3><a name="ratings"></a>Ratings</h3>
<p>The issue of credibility does not require <i>all</i> title listings to
@@ -770,17 +792,16 @@
takes these likelihoods into account. A bond rating agency does not put
its money where its mouth is -- it does not issue bond insurance to back
its likelihood estimates. Rather, it backs its estimates with its reputation,
- which can become quite valueable, but is still cheaper than issuing insurance.</p>
+ which can become quite valuable, but is still cheaper than issuing insurance.</p>
<p>Similarly, in our situation, we can imagine a market of third party raters
- that post judgements of the likelihood that transfer of a given title
- will actually be honored [<a href="#Stanley01">Stanley01</a>]. Simply
- recording each village's track record of honoring past title transfers,
- and assuming the future will be like the recent past, is a low overhead
- procedure that's plausibly adequate. And it places each villiage in an
- iterated game with the system as a whole, providing it an incentive to
- treat these titles as legitimate claims. We can think of this as a credit
- report, not for an individual, but for a village and its system of local
- law.</p>
+ that post judgments of the likelihood that transfer of a given title will
+ actually be honored [<a href="#Stanley01">Stanley01</a>]. Simply recording
+ each village's track record of honoring past title transfers, and assuming
+ the future will be like the recent past, is a low overhead procedure that's
+ plausibly adequate. And it places each village in an iterated game with
+ the system as a whole, providing it an incentive to treat these titles
+ as legitimate claims. We can think of this as a credit report, not for
+ an individual, but for a village and its system of local law.</p>
<h3><a name="video"></a>Video Contracts</h3>
<p>But legitimacy is more than just preserving local arrangements, and it
is more than just incentives or force. It is knowing in your bones what
@@ -791,7 +812,7 @@
were true, Bob would have heard about it from Sam. The evidence presented
by these disembodied strangers are impersonal electronic records Bob can
hardly understand, much less verify. Perhaps Bob is told the veracity
- of these records can be verfied by cryptographic means. Why should Bob
+ of these records can be verified by cryptographic means. Why should Bob
believe them? Absent coercive power to evict, why should Bob even take
them seriously? Why not just stay in his home?</p>
<p>Bob's community does have power of various sort over him, probably including
@@ -804,7 +825,7 @@
minds, but complex lawyer-written contracts on paper no longer plausibly
meet this standard. Verbal contracts often do at the moment of the handshake
-- both parties have just had a rich conversational interaction, full
- of all the concious and subconcious cues we use to understand what each
+ of all the conscious and subconscious cues we use to understand what each
other understands -- so they plausibly have a good sense of what they
jointly mean to agree to. However, memory is fleeting, so people turned
instead to paper to record agreements, trading away richness, sincerity,
@@ -841,14 +862,14 @@
coupled to legality. With the exception of Italy, for a business in these
countries to be judged legitimate by the culture, and for others to consider
their dealings with this business to be legitimate, the business must
- be legal -- it must be operate within the formal legal system. By contrast,
+ be legal -- it must operate within the formal legal system. By contrast,
in Italy and among the informals, the formal legal system has no monopoly
on legitimacy -- many extralegal institutions enjoy widespread popular
legitimacy.</p>
<p>As explained above, a new system of law will only be seen as legitimate
- if it accomodates, incorporates, and builds on pre-existing systems of
- legitimacy. The pre-existing formal and informal systems each have a very
- different kind of great complexity; and the effort to accomodate this
+ if it accommodates, incorporates, and builds on preexisting systems of
+ legitimacy. The preexisting formal and informal systems each have a very
+ different kind of great complexity; and the effort to accommodate this
complexity, to express these rules in the language of smart contracts,
can seriously impede these transitions. </p>
<p>Among the informals the great complexity comes from the sheer number
@@ -893,10 +914,10 @@
bloom, creating vast wealth, how would this effect the first world?</p>
<p>Formal laws in the first world do change under political pressure. One
of the more effective sources of pressure are those who stand to gain
- from large scale commerce with the rest of the world. Once a signicant
- part of the world's economy is occuring in the digital path, first world
+ from large scale commerce with the rest of the world. Once a significant
+ part of the world's economy is occurring in the digital path, first world
businesses would then face a choice -- trade with these networks or stay
- legal-legitimate. This is an unpeasant choice both for them and their
+ legal-legitimate. This is an unpleasant choice both for them and their
governments. The pressures will be great to legalize trade with these
jurisdiction-free networks of commerce. Once such unregulatable trade
is made legitimate, the dam will have burst. What will be the character
@@ -916,7 +937,7 @@
be made binding, with the law serving as the mutually trusted intermediary
for securing the arrangement. With smart contracts, the encoded rules
themselves becomes the logic of their own enforcement, subject only to
- the honesty, not the judgement or skill, of a diverse market of competing
+ the honesty, not the judgment or skill, of a diverse market of competing
contract hosts. This competition forms a vastly stronger and fully decentralized
system of checks and balances. </p>
<p>The third world could rise on an enhanced version of the principles on
@@ -929,6 +950,8 @@
Shapiro, Terry Stanley, Nick Szabo, E-Dean Tribble, Bill Tulloh, Ka-Ping
Yee, and the members of the e-lang mailing list.</p>
<h3><a name="refs"></a>References</h3>
+ <p><a name="Amix91"></a>[Amix91] Derived from work done by Dean Tribble
+ and Randy Farmer for AMIX, The American Information Exchange, circa 1991.</p>
<p><a name="Bartley62"></a>[Bartley62] William W. Bartley, III, <i><b>The
Retreat to Commitment</b> </i>Open Court Publishing, 1962.</p>
<p><a name="Birch97"></a>[Burch97] Greg Burch, personal communication.</p>
@@ -940,8 +963,9 @@
<p><a name="Engelbart62"></a>[Engelbart62] Doug Engelbart "<b>Augmenting
Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework</b>", SRI Project no. 3578,
October 1962.</p>
- <p><a name="Fukuyama95"></a>[Fukuyama95] Francis Fukuyama, "<b>Trust</b>",
- Free Press Paperbacks, 1995. </p>
+ <p><a name="Fukuyama95"></a>[Fukuyama95] Francis Fukuyama, "<b>Trust:
+ The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity</b>", Free Press
+ Paperbacks, 1995. </p>
<p><a name="Granovetter73"></a>[Granovetter73] Mark Granovetter, "<b>The
Strength of Weak Ties</b>", in: American Journal of Sociology (1973)
Vol. 78, pp.1360-1380.</p>
@@ -984,8 +1008,7 @@
Antropology of Law: a comparative theory</b>", Harper and Row, 1971.</p>
<p><a name="Rees96"></a>[Rees96] Jonathan Rees, "<b>A Security Kernel
Based on the Lambda-Calculus</b>", (MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1996) MIT
- AI Memo No. 1564. <a href="http://mumble.net/jar/pubs/%20secureos/">http://mumble.net/jar/pubs/
- secureos/</a>.</p>
+ AI Memo No. 1564. <a href="http://mumble.net/jar/pubs/secureos/">http://mumble.net/jar/pubs/secureos/</a>.</p>
<p><a name="Selgin01"></a>[Selgin01] George Selgin, personal communication.</p>
<p><a name="Shapiro99"></a>[Shapiro99] Jonathan S. Shapiro, "<b>EROS:
A Capability System</b>", Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania,
@@ -999,7 +1022,7 @@
To Capability Based Security</b>", Online at <a href="http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/capabilityIntro/index.html">http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/capabilityIntro/index.html</a>.</p>
<p><a name="Szabo97"></a>[Szabo97] Nick Szabo, "<b>Formalizing and
Securing Relationships on Public Networks</b>", First Monday, vol
- 2 no 9, 1997. Updated copy at <a href="http://www.best.com/%7Eszabo/formalize.html">http://www.best.com/~szabo/formalize.html</a>.</p>
+ 2 no 9, 1997. Updated copy at <a href="http://szabo.best.vwh.net/formalize.html">http://szabo.best.vwh.net/formalize.html</a>.</p>
<p><a name="Szabo98"></a>[Szabo98] Nick Szabo, "<b>Video Contracts</b>",
1998. Online at <a href="http://szabo.best.vwh.net/video.html">http://szabo.best.vwh.net/video.html</a>.</p>
<p><a name="Tribble95"></a>[Tribble95] Eric Dean Tribble, Mark S. Miller,
1.2 +1 -1 e/doc/talks/pisa/paper/pencil-brick-law.html
Index: pencil-brick-law.html
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@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@
To Capability Based Security</b>", Online at <a href="http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/capabilityIntro/index.html">http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/capabilityIntro/index.html</a>.</p>
<p><a name="Szabo97"></a>[Szabo97] Nick Szabo, "<b>Formalizing and
Securing Relationships on Public Networks</b>", First Monday, vol
- 2 no 9, 1997. Updated copy at <a href="http://www.best.com/%7Eszabo/formalize.html">http://www.best.com/~szabo/formalize.html</a>.</p>
+ 2 no 9, 1997. Updated copy at <a href="http://szabo.best.vwh.net/formalize.html">http://szabo.best.vwh.net/formalize.html</a>.</p>
<p><a name="Tribble95"></a>[Tribble95] Eric Dean Tribble, Mark S. Miller,
Norm Hardy, Dave Krieger, "<b>Joule: Distributed Application Foundations</b>",
http://www.agorics.com/joule.html, 1995.</p>