[e-cvs] cvs commit: e/doc/talks/pisa/paper index.html
markm@eros.cs.jhu.edu
markm@eros.cs.jhu.edu
Wed, 16 Jan 2002 14:58:22 -0500
markm 02/01/16 14:58:22
Modified: doc/talks/pisa/paper index.html
Log:
fixes. Thanks Jack Birner
Revision Changes Path
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Index: index.html
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</TABLE>
<hr>
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- <p align="center"><i>Draft paper to be submitted to "<a href="http://panoramix.univ-paris1.fr/AHTEA/colloques.html">Austrian
+ <p align="center"><i>Draft paper accepted by "<a href="http://panoramix.univ-paris1.fr/AHTEA/colloques.html">Austrian
Perspectives on the New Economy</a>".<br>
Please comment.</i></p>
<h1><a name="abstract"></a>Abstract</h1>
@@ -251,17 +251,18 @@
Roger Ebert, notaries, arbiters, courts and cops, money, etc... The list
is endless. </p>
<p><img src="images/2-low-trust.gif" width="350" height="218" align="right">From
- a simple graph-theoretic point of view (inspired by [<a href="#Granovetter73">Granovetter73</a>]),
- we can analyze the Fukuyama low-trust world (in which the fanout from
- each node is small) and the de Soto missing-hub world, and immediately
- recognize which effect has the greater impact on a society's effectiveness:
- it is the absence of the hubs that ultimately prevents large scale complex
- cooperative arrangements from forming. Even with high cultural proclivity
- for individual-to-individual trust, in the absence of hubs, the resulting
- virtual network would at best form small islands of densely connected
- networks, only loosely connected to each other. The resulting picture
- resembles both Fukuyama's portrayal of familial trust societies, and de
- Soto's portrayal of networks of villages of informals.</p>
+ a simple graph-theoretic point of view (inspired by [<a href="#Granovetter73">Granovetter73</a>,
+ <a href="#London97" target="_top">London97</a>]), we can analyze the Fukuyama
+ low-trust world (in which the fanout from each node is small) and the
+ de Soto missing-hub world, and immediately recognize which effect has
+ the greater impact on a society's effectiveness: it is the absence of
+ the hubs that ultimately prevents large scale complex cooperative arrangements
+ from forming. Even with high cultural proclivity for individual-to-individual
+ trust, in the absence of hubs, the resulting virtual network would at
+ best form small islands of densely connected networks, only loosely connected
+ to each other. The resulting picture resembles both Fukuyama's portrayal
+ of familial trust societies, and de Soto's portrayal of networks of villages
+ of informals.</p>
<div align="center">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tr>
@@ -662,7 +663,7 @@
host is already managing access to this chair, we may as well have it
double as the issuer for the eright to sit in this chair. Just as Alice
could tell the $-Issuer to transfer some of her money from her purse to
- some else's, we can enable Alice to tell the contract host to transfer
+ someone else's, we can enable Alice to tell the contract host to transfer
her eright to sit in this chair to someone else. The contract host would
then revoke Alice's access to the chair and issue fresh access to the
other player, much as the $-Issuer would with Alice's money.</p>
@@ -737,7 +738,7 @@
can be uploaded to widely trusted contract hosts. </p>
<p>The third step enables the local-knowledge embodying rights created in
the previous steps to be widely tradable erights. This step allows these
- three steps to applied repeatedly, creating complex networks of contracts
+ three steps to be applied repeatedly, creating complex networks of contracts
that build on each other. This allows the second step to be applied yet
again to create yet more abstract erights, like mortgage, setting loose
the power of capital formation. The collateral would be, not the physical
@@ -947,20 +948,20 @@
honestly. Any one government going bad would endanger many contracts and
much property, but will cause a flight of electronic business towards
climates expected to remain freer. </p>
- <p><i>Fault tolerant computing</i> studies how to build reliable systems
- from unreliable components. For example, for certain demanding applications
- an individual actual computer may be considered unreliable, but a reliable
- virtual computer may be synthesized from several actual computers by comparing
- the outcome of each step in a kind of voting process. Due to dangers of
- regulatory capture as well as internal corruption, an actual first-world
- trust hub may be considered an analogously unreliable component. From
- a set of these we may synthesize a reliable virtual trust hub in a variety
- of ways, such as a <i>voting protocol</i> in which a <i>quorum</i> of,
- let's say, 5 out of 7 actual contract hosts have to agree on an outcome
- in order for it to be considered an outcome of the synthetic virtual contract
- host; and in order for that game's issuers to honor the outcome. These
- issuers themselves can be virtual reliable issuers in this same sense
- [<a href="#Szabo99">Szabo99</a>]. </p>
+ <p>The field of <i>fault tolerant computing</i> studies how to build reliable
+ systems from unreliable components. For example, for certain demanding
+ applications an individual actual computer may be considered unreliable,
+ but a reliable virtual computer may be synthesized from several actual
+ computers by comparing the outcome of each step in a kind of voting process.
+ Due to dangers of regulatory capture as well as internal corruption, an
+ actual first-world trust hub may be considered an analogously unreliable
+ component. From a set of these we may synthesize a reliable virtual trust
+ hub in a variety of ways, such as a <i>voting protocol</i> in which a
+ <i>quorum</i> of, let's say, 5 out of 7 actual contract hosts have to
+ agree on an outcome in order for it to be considered an outcome of the
+ synthetic virtual contract host; and in order for that game's issuers
+ to honor the outcome. These issuers themselves can be virtual reliable
+ issuers in this same sense [<a href="#Szabo99">Szabo99</a>]. </p>
<p>Making such technologies work is tricky, so we should not try to achieve
trans-jurisdictional fault tolerance before we get started, but we should
also make sure not to paint ourselves into a corner -- we need to understand
@@ -1067,12 +1068,12 @@
which the West grew rich.</p>
<h3><a name="acks"></a>Acknowledgments</h3>
<p>These ideas have formed over much time and many valuable conversations,
- for which we thank Darius Bacon, Greg Burch, K. Eric Drexler, Charles
- Evans, John Gilmore, Michael Glenn, Ian Grigg, Robin Hanson, Doug Jackson,
- Ken Kahn, Don Lavoie, Ted Nelson, Zooko (Bryce Wilcox-O'Hearn), Gayle
- Pergamit, Chris Peterson, Jonathan Shapiro, Terry Stanley, Nick Szabo,
- E-Dean Tribble, Bill Tulloh, Ka-Ping Yee, and the members of the e-lang
- mailing list.</p>
+ for which we thank Darius Bacon, Jack Birner, Greg Burch, K. Eric Drexler,
+ Charles Evans, Robert Gerrard, John Gilmore, Michael Glenn, Ian Grigg,
+ Robin Hanson, Doug Jackson, Ken Kahn, Don Lavoie, Ted Nelson, Zooko (Bryce Wilcox-O'Hearn),
+ Gayle Pergamit, Chris Peterson, Jonathan Shapiro, Terry Stanley, Nick
+ Szabo, E-Dean Tribble, Bill Tulloh, Ka-Ping Yee, and the members of the
+ e-lang mailing list.</p>
<h3><a name="refs"></a>References</h3>
<p><a name="Amix91"></a>[Amix91] Derived from work done by Dean Tribble
and Randy Farmer for AMIX, The American Information Exchange, circa 1991.</p>
@@ -1134,6 +1135,8 @@
Perspectives on the New Economy</a></i>, 2001.</p>
<p><a name="Lessig99"></a>[Lessig99] Larry Lessig, "<b>Code, and Other
Laws of Cyberspace</b>", Basic Books, 1999. Excepts online at <a href="http://code-is-law.org/">http://code-is-law.org/</a>.</p>
+ <p><a name="London97"></a>[London97] Tom London, personal communications,
+ 1997.</p>
<p><a name="Mill69"></a>[Mill69] John Stuart Mill, "<b>On Liberty</b>",
London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869. Online at <a href="http://www.bartleby.com/130/2.html">http://www.bartleby.com/130/2.html</a>.</p>
<p><a name="Miller95"></a>[Miller95] Mark S. Miller, E. Dean Tribble, Ravi