Thoughts on droplets v. Notes

[shapj@us.ibm.com]

Damn.  Did it again.

Jonathan S. Shapiro, Ph. D.
Research Staff Member
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Email: shapj@us.ibm.com
Phone: +1 914 784 7085  (Tieline: 863)
Fax: +1 914 784 7595


---------------------- Forwarded by Jonathan S Shapiro/Watson/IBM on
11/02/99 03:51 PM ---------------------------

Jonathan S Shapiro
11/02/99 03:50 PM

To:   tyler@waterken.com
cc:
From: Jonathan S Shapiro/Watson/IBM@ibmus
Subject:  RE: Thoughts on droplets v. Notes  (Document link: Jonathan S
      Shapiro)

>If these object identifiers are 'cryptographically
>protected', then they are no longer simple object
>identifiers. I believe you confuse the discussion by
>referring to them as object identifiers.

You are right.

For my edification, is there a reason to believe that Swiss numbers are
preferable to cryptographically signed capabilities from the standpoint of
security?

> If an object identifier is unguessable and only
> communicated over secured channels, then it is a
> capability.

I'm not clear that the "only communicated over secure channels" constraint
is required.  It doesn't appear to me to be satisfied by E/Pluribus or
Droplets, because the endpoints are not secure.


Jonathan S. Shapiro, Ph. D.
Research Staff Member
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Email: shapj@us.ibm.com
Phone: +1 914 784 7085  (Tieline: 863)
Fax: +1 914 784 7595