[E-Lang] Hash Chaining & Capabilities, Proposal #2d: Deputizing Remote Vats

[Ben Laurie]

Nikita Borisov wrote:
> 
> Bill Frantz writes:
> >(4) To protect from double spending, Bob must immediately clear the coin
> >with the bank, which is why the protocol is online.  Bob can be identified
> >if Alice and the bank cooperate.
> >
> >The offline protocol modifies the online protocol by:
> >
> >(0) Bob creates the coin, blinds it, and sends it to Alice.
> >
> >(1) Alice also blinds it with her own blinding factor.
> >
> >...
> 
> I'm not sure that I would call this an offline protocol, since at step
> (2), Alice still has to interact with the bank.  It just shifts which of
> Alice and Bob talks to the bank.  The offline payment systems that I'm
> familiar with rely on auditable double spending; i.e. the protocol is
> payer anonymous if a coin has been spent only once, but the payer's
> identity is revealed in the case of double spending.

Interesting. How does that work?

Cheers,

Ben.

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