[E-Lang] defense in depth
Thu, 25 Jan 2001 11:33:55 -0800
At 11:07 AM 1/25/01 -0800, email@example.com wrote:
>Would this be an example of defense in depth:
>I receive signed, mobile code from a remote system. I compare the
>signature against a list of key holders I trust in order to decide to run
>the code. As a further assurance, I only give the code capabilities to
>use those files which should be necessary for its operation.
>More concretely, suppose the company I work for authorizes only certain
>programs to be run on workers' machines, and it does so by issuing a
>signature by a company-controlled key on those programs. Only if I see
>this signature will I allow the program to run on my machine.
>Now, if the capability system fails, I'm probably still OK because the
>mobile code is unlikely to be hostile since it was signed by someone
>I trust. Or if the signature system fails (perhaps the signature key
>was stolen), the damage a malicious applet can inflict is limited because
>it only has capabilities appropriate to its task. We have two defenses
>and both have to fail for catastrophe to occur.
>Would this form of defense in depth be appropriate for use in conjunction
>with a capability system?
This sounds like a fine example of "making a system where it is safe to run
user tracking that seem part and parcel of modern web technology. However,
EROS should be able to keep it from installing Trojan horses,
counterfeiting windows, and stealing data.