[e-lang] A promise based JSON command shell

[David-Sarah Hopwood]

Tyler Close wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 12:14 PM, Mike Samuel <mikesamuel at gmail.com> wrote:
>> 2009/4/28 Tyler Close <tyler.close at gmail.com>:
>>> So, the scenario is:
>>>
>>> The browser's window.location is:
>>> <https://example.com/foo?secret=asdfasdf>
>>>
>>> And the attacker can put a link on that page:
>>> <a href="#iagree=yes">click me</a>
>>>
>>> Thus causing a GET request to:
>>> <https://example.com/foo?secret=asdfasdf&iagree=yes>
>>>
>>> Are there additional scenarios you're thinking of, or is that the only one?
>>
>> Yes, that's the one that occurs to me.  [...]
>
> For this attack to work, all of the following must be true:
> 1. There's an authorization secret somewhere in the base URL
> 2. The attacker can put an <a> tag on the page and get the user to click it.
> 3. The server treats query string arguments as overrides of the
> arguments in the JSON request entity. (the lib.Q methods don't provide
> a way to put form data in the Request-URI, other than the 'q'
> parameter, so the form data must be in the JSON request entity).

If the fragment is #q=foo, can that override the 'q' parameter?

-- 
David-Sarah Hopwood ⚥