[EROS-Arch] Re: [E-Lang] Re: Interaction Design for End-User Security

[Joerg Bornschein]

On Thu, Mar 22, 2001 at 10:42:44AM -0600, trey@treysoft.com wrote:

Hello,

> > This is true, but you still have to trust large ports of the system to which
> > you present your token. And you have to trust your (local) userinterface
> > to do the operations you requested.
> > 
> > Note that you might be using trojaned software without noticing it.
> > 
> If your Jr. Spaceman's Decoder Ring does all of the encrypting, the attacker
> can't hope for much more than garbage data, no?  (I realize this makes all
> sorts of assumptions about initial trust relationships, etc.)

I agree, authentication with hardware token you trust not to leek information
is a big step ahead.

But you're still lost, if your ssh client, graphics/keyboadr/mouse driver or
anything else in your I/O path inserts commands you did not intend to.

Or the "login screen", which requests you to insert your token, is not 
systems one.
 
These things happen...

   joerg

-- 
 The known is finite; the unknown infinite.    Intellectually we stand on 
  an islet in the midst of an illimitable ocean of inexplicability. Our
  business in every generation is to reclaim a little more land..
 						    	     --T.H. Huxley