[EROS-Arch] Re: [E-Lang] Re: Interaction Design for End-User Security

[Ben Laurie]

wojtek@ifirma.pl wrote:
> 
> You are right.  I get it. Let me think it over again.
> 
> This problem might be reduced to: verify what you boot.
> 
> But wait a minute, there is an option, unfortunately quite hard to
> implement: boot from the token. It would require two things to be put on a
> token: 1. bootstrap 2. kernel signature. Then the bootstrap would only load
> the kernel from hard drive and verify its signature.  Then the kernel would
> be responsible for verifying signatures of software it loads. The trusted
> set of certificates might reside on the token. Lets also grant that the
> bootstrap and your OS vendor cert is always read-only.
> 
> Do you find this possible? Anything wrong in this scenario?

There is a BIOS project that does this (Mark will remember what its
called, I'm sure - I've gone blank).

Cheers,

Ben.

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