Norman Hardy wrote:
>
> I have been multiprocessing my reply to the last entry on this topic for a
> few weeks. I now have a few notes at
> <http://www.mediacity.com/~norm/SSL/SSL2.html> that I think I did not say
> clearly or coherently before.
I think that objection neglects the use of client certificates. It would be the cookie/client cert combination that determines access by C to the state C'. Since D is unable to forge C's client cert, D is unable to hijack the session. In some instances, even the cookie may be redundant (e.g. if there is only a single server context for each particular client).
If all you are after is non-hijackability of sessions, the client can even use a cert you are unable to check. Or, perhaps even better, an ephemeral one.
Cheers,
Ben.
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